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ABSTRACT. This paper explores interrelations between pricing, capacity choice, and
financing in transportation networks. We build on the Mohring-Harwitz result on
self-financing of optimally designed and priced roads and investigate it in a network
environment under various types of second-best regulation. A small network model
with endogenous car ownership demonstrates that optimal congestion pricing and
capacity choice over an entire network may cause user prices to increase more in
initially mildly congested areas compared to heavily congested areas. Furthermore, a
flat kilometer charge under optimal capacity choice may result in first-best efficiency
gains.
1. INTRODUCTION
Traffic congestion is one of the daily recurring problems resulting from
the high car-dependence in most modern societies. The economic approach to
analyzing traffic congestion and congestion policies can be summarized as
viewing a congested road as a distorted market on which travelers demand a
service (the use of the road network), and supply is defined by the capacity of
the road(s) in the network. A distortion exists because travel time losses from
congestion constitute an externality; individual users consider their own travel
times when deciding whether or when to use the road, but typically ignore the
implied travel time losses for others (e.g., Small, 1992). Travel speeds are
simultaneously determined—among other factors—by the intensity of use
and the capacity on offer (e.g., the number of lanes). Two archetype policies
for coping with congestion can therefore be distinguished immediately in such
economic frameworks. The first involves measures that aim to affect the
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demand for road use or its distribution over time, place, or links given the
network’s capacity. The second involves adjustments—usually increases—in
capacity levels. Capacity expansion has been the dominant practice of policy-
making for most societies. In contrast, much of the economic literature has
focused on demand management in general and road pricing in particular
(e.g., Button and Verhoef, 1998), motivated by the inefficiency of unregulated
congested road use and by the economic insight that corrective pricing could
lead to an improvement in efficiency when externalities are present.
Nevertheless, one of the most famous results in transport economics,
due to Mohring and Harwitz (1962), establishes an important relationship
between demand management and capacity policies; under certain technical
conditions, the revenues from optimal congestion pricing will be just sufficient
for financing the costs associated with optimal capacity supply. The conditions
are satisfied when (1) capacity is adjustable in continuous increments,
(2) capacity can be expanded at constant marginal cost, and (3) trip costs
are homogeneous of degree zero in usage and capacity. This ‘‘self-financing’’
theorem is an application of the so-called Product Exhaustion Theorem, a
particular case of Euler’s Theorem, which states that with constant returns
to scale in production and marginal cost pricing, the value of outputs equals
the value of inputs. The theorem has been shown to extend to each road
individually in a full network and consequently to the network in aggregate,
provided each link is optimally priced and all capacities are optimized (Yang
and Meng, 2002), to dynamic models (Arnott, De Palma and Lindsey, 1993),
and in present-value terms when adjustment costs and depreciation are
allowed (Arnott and Kraus, 1998).1
Empirical evidence suggests that conditions (2) and (3) may hold at least
approximately in a range of circumstances; estimates of the ratio of long-run
average and marginal costs are often relatively close to unity (Small, 1992,
Sections 3.4, 3.5; see also Section 2 this paper). Under such conditions, optimal
profits or deficits under optimal road design and pricing will be relatively
small, but unlikely zero. Condition (1) typically does not hold for a single
road because the number of lanes is discrete. Yet capacity can be varied by
widening lanes, by resurfacing, or by regrading or straightening a stretch of
road. And capacity may be almost perfectly divisible at the scale of a road
network (Lindsey and Verhoef, 2000).
Therefore, the theorem may be relevant for practical policymaking. First,
application would help in achieving an efficient road system in terms of
optimal capacities and pricing. Furthermore, it firmly reduces the need to
1A convenient feature of first-best pricing—on all links of a network—is that the toll
formulae for optimal link tolls are independent of traffic conditions on other links, unlike
second-best toll formulae (e.g., Verhoef, 2002). Similarly, under first-best pricing link capacities
can be optimized without reference to what is going on elsewhere on the network. First-best
capacity choice thus requires less information than second-best capacity choice.
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use tax revenues from other sources for financing roads. This may improve
efficiency further because other taxes are often distortionary. It may also help
in overcoming problems of public acceptability of road pricing. The resulting
scheme may be perceived as fair (only the users of a road pay for its capacity)
and transparent (there are no hidden transfers surrounding the financing of
roads). Last, the theorem’s application may lead to improved transparency of
political decisions regarding infrastructure expansion. If the technical assump-
tions are fulfilled, road capacity should be expanded when short-run optimal
congestion pricing yields revenues per unit of capacity that exceed the unit
(capital) cost of capacity.2 Although comparable rules can be formulated for
discrete units of capacity such as lanes, they will be more complex due to the
inherent ‘‘integer problem.’’ Therefore, the market would indicate whether
expansion is socially warranted, generally improving the transparency and
credibility of cost–benefit analyses.
Despite these advantages, the self-financing principle has not been
applied because the idea of network-wide optimal congestion pricing was
much more an academic curiosity than a realistic policy option until recently.
However, increases in congestion, the decreasing scope and increasing costs of
further capacity expansions in congested areas, and the development of tech-
nologies enabling electronic toll collection have changed the viability of con-
gestion pricing in road transportation. Investigating the applicability of the
self-financing theorem for practical applications in greater detail, the aim of
this paper, is important due to the limited social acceptance of congestion
pricing per se and the greater acceptance expected if roads are financed
exclusively by their specific tools.
First-best congestion pricing must be applied on all links of the road
network for the theorem to hold; however, many practical policy proposals
foresee implementation of prices on only a limited number of links. Examples
include toll cordons, pay-lanes, and area schemes such as those recently
introduced in London. Verhoef (2002) explored the implications for pricing
per se under such second-best circumstances. This paper addresses some
implications of second-best congestion pricing for the applicability of the self-
financing theorem. The second-best cases addressed include pricing on a
subset of links, pricing through undifferentiated kilometer charges that is
equivalent to a fuel tax under our simplifying assumptions, and pricing
through fixed annual vehicle taxes. We also analyze the optimal use of the
latter two traditional tax instruments when link-based tolls can also be estab-
lished. For that reason, the model allows for endogenous car ownership, which
is particularly relevant for assessing the effects of changes in annual taxes.
2To see why, observe that for a given demand function, both the short-run optimal
congestion price (i.e., for a given capacity) and the road use per unit of capacity are decreasing
in capacity. Short-run optimal toll revenues per unit of capacity therefore exceed the unit cost of
capacity with a below-optimal total capacity.
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Especially in Europe, so-called variabilization of vehicle taxes, replacing
annual taxes by use-based taxes, is often considered the only viable way of
introducing marginal cost pricing in road transport due to acceptability con-
siderations. However, some analysts fear that abandoning annual taxes would
lead to increased car ownership and an associated outward shift of the
demand for road use so that the scheme’s eventual impact on congestion
may be limited. Therefore, it is interesting to consider the optimal use of
annual taxes when optimal link tolls are in place with endogenous car own-
ership. Finally, we study how insights might change when a benefit arises
from raising such taxes because other taxes are distortionary or when total
tax revenues are exogeneously constrained and capacity cannot be freely
adjusted.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 introduces the model and discusses the calibration of its
parameters for the numerical version. Section 4 reports our main findings.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. PRIOR LITERATURE
Mohring and Harwitz (1962) were the first to establish that, under the
conditions set out earlier, the revenues from optimal congestion tolling are
equal to the cost of providing the optimal capacity of the road. In fact, they
derived a more general result, namely that the ratio between toll revenues
and capacity cost equals the elasticity of total capacity costs with respect to
capacity. Although the Mohring-Harwitz result is now generally considered
one of the cornerstones of transportation economics, apparently it was largely
unnoticed at the time. Strotz (1965) reached similar results a few years later.3
The initial lack of attention to the result is possibly explained by doubts about
its practical significance for transportation policy. For example, one may
doubt whether the cost function is appropriately specified, whether the static
model of road congestion is appropriate, and whether congestion tolls can be
successfully introduced and sufficiently varied over time. Eventually, these
problems received attention and we discuss the main results of more recent
studies below.
Keeler and Small (1977) considered the implementation of the Mohring-
Harwitz analysis to urban expressways from an empirical perspective. The
homogeneity of degree zero of the transport cost function was not assessed
empirically, but assumed on the basis of ‘‘considerable empirical evidence’’ (p. 3)
and they measured the cost of capacity as the sum of construction, land
acquisition, and maintenance costs. They found no evidence of (dis)economies
3Strotz’s analysis was based on Mohring and Harwitz (1962), and Strotz, Mohring, and
Harwitz were all at Northwestern University at that time. Strotz (1965) references Mohring and
Harwitz (1962) and Strotz attributes the similarity between his first parable and the Mohring-
Harwitz framework to the help provided by Mohring in formulating it.
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of scale in construction cost. Therefore, their study confirms the Mohring and
Harwitz conjecture that the conditions under which the self-financing result
holds are plausible. Kraus (1981) used engineering data in a simple network
setting and concluded that there are probably increasing returns to scale.
His best estimates show optimal tolling would cover 84 percent of capital
cost. He interprets his findings as ‘‘not that different from those of Keeler
and Small’’ (p. 20) who found constant returns to scale. Small, Winston, and
Evans (1989) suggest there are probably increasing returns to scale in the
construction of single roads of a given type because the costs of shoulders and
median strip are independent of capacity. Integration of such roads into
networks by intersections and other means would probably cause decreasing
returns to scale. Their base-case numerical model has practically constant
returns to scale. More recently, Levinson and Gillen (1998) report a point
estimate for the ratio between long-run average and marginal cost of
0.92 for autos, but 1.45 for single trucks and 1.96 for combination trucks,
suggesting mild diseconomies for passenger cars and considerable economies
for trucks.
Stahl (1981) developed an analytical model in which capacity cost depends
on the number of road users. He states that cost will be exactly recovered
under optimal pricing in this framework if the cost function is homogeneous of
degree one, but argues that available evidence suggests that these conditions
are not satisfied in reality.4 In particular, he points to ‘‘evidence of substantial
increasing returns to scale in highway pavement thickness’’ (p. 18). However,
Newbery (1988, 1989) reconsidered this issue and concluded that ‘‘if there are
constant returns to scale in roads construction (for roads of given strength),
and if there are strictly constant returns to road use (in the sense that heavy
vehicles distribute themselves uniformly over road width), then the optimal
road user charge (congestion charge plus road damage charge) will recover all
road costs (maintenance and interest on capital) even if there are substantial
economies of scale in road construction’’ (Newbery, 1989, p. 167). The result
requires that there are constant returns to scale in constructing roads with a
given strength at different capacities. If this is the case, economies of scale in
strengthening roads are unimportant. The optimal policy response to road
damage externalities is a flat charge per ‘‘equivalent standard axle load’’ and
Newbery (1988) established a self-financing property of this tax that is analo-
gous to the Mohring-Harwitz result with respect to the congestion externality.
Small, Winston, and Evans (1989) considered issues of congestion and road
damage in a multiproduct framework. Even though they found substantial
economies of scale in providing pavement, they conclude that the road system
as a whole comes close to self-financing because of the diseconomies of scope
4Stahl (1981, p. 18). Stahl’s model also contains external effects other than congestion.
These external effects should be homogeneous of degree zero in the number of road users and
capacity in order to have self-financing of capacity under optimal pricing and capacity choice.
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involved in the simultaneous production of road capacity for passenger cars
and trucks. The presence of these diseconomies means that the joint supply of
infrastructure for cars and trucks causes additional cost in comparison to the
provision of separate infrastructure for both types of traffic.
Another issue that has received attention concerns the market for land.
Contrary to the standard assumptions, the supply function of land for road
capacity expansion may be rising when the road is large enough to drive up
the price of land. In this case, the distinction between returns to scale, a
property of production functions, and economies of scale, a property of cost
functions, becomes important (Small, 1999). A general equilibrium analysis by
Berechman and Pines (1991) showed that so-called imputed profits will have
the same sign as the degree of returns to scale of the production function,
where imputed profits are based on a cost measure for land obtained by
multiplying the amount of land used by its shadow price. However, Small
(1999) observed that these imputed profits correspond to actual profits only for
a factor price-taker. Instead, a road authority often possesses market power in
the land market. Small (1999) showed that the sign of actual profits from
highway operation under first-best marginal cost pricing will still be deter-
mined by the degree of scale of the actual cost function, which differs from the
degree of returns to scale of production with a rising supply curve for land.
This holds for both cases with and without price discrimination by a mono-
psonistic road authority in the land market. The critical condition for exact
self-financing under marginal cost pricing thus involves the degree of econo-
mies of scale of the cost function and not the degree of returns to scale of the
production function.
The Mohring-Harwitz result was originally obtained in the context of the
static model of road congestion pioneered by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924).
Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993) showed that the self-financing result
also holds for Vickrey’s (1969) dynamic bottleneck model when road users are
homogeneous. A remarkable aspect of their analysis is that it holds ‘‘independ-
ent of the form of the pricing system employed. If a road system should be self-
financing when a sophisticated tolling system is employed, it should also be
self-financing when only a flat parking fee is applied’’ (p. 173, italics in
original). Their result stems from the fact that the flat pricing schedule,
although second-best, nevertheless confronts all drivers with marginal social
costs in the second-best optimum. When this is not the case, self-financing
may break down, as illustrated by Mohring (1970), for the case where the
same toll level applies both during peak and off-peak periods in a static model.
Also Bichsel (2001) showed that the self-financing result does not hold if there
are two groups of users that use the road at different times and the toll is
restricted to be uniform.
An additional issue concerns heterogeneity of road users. Arnott and
Kraus (1998) considered the bottleneck model with heterogeneous users and
concluded that marginal cost pricing and the associated self-financing
property would still be feasible with an anonymous congestion toll if the
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heterogeneity concerns unobservable differences such as the value of time and
if tolling is unconstrained, that is, the toll can vary arbitrarily over time.
Last, two additional studies bear a close relationship to the issues studied
in this paper although they are not directly related to the question of self-
financing. De Borger (2001) developed a model for analyzing transport pricing
in which car ownership is endogenized and explained simultaneously with the
demand for trips or kilometers. Although De Borger’s model refers to an
unspecified externality that could be congestion, he does not incorporate
road capacity, and therefore does not consider its financing. A related study
by Mayeres and Proost (1997) examined optimal tax and public investment
rules in the context of an applied general equilibrium model with congestion;
however, they do not refer to the Mohring-Harwitz result and provide no
information about the ratio between capacity cost and toll revenues in the
optimal situation. One of the interesting aspects of their analysis is that
the optimal congestion taxes and congestion levels are almost unaffected by
the degree of inequality aversion used by the regulator (p. 277). This suggests
that distributional concerns are of minor importance in the design of an
optimal policy concerning congestion and road infrastructure.
3. THE MODEL
The model should have a number of characteristics to address the
research questions identified in Section 1. First, a network larger than a
single road is needed to study second-best charges confined to only a subset
of links. Second, car ownership should be endogenized to study the role of
fixed annual vehicle ownership taxes in the context of ‘‘variabilization’’ and to
prevent these from entering as a perfect lump-sum tax. Given these require-
ments, we develop a model as simple and transparent as possible. Therefore,
its numerical version should be considered much more as a mathematical
system that allows us to study the main issues in a consistent equilibrium
setting than as an attempt to represent any realistic network, although its
calibration deploys some empirical evidence. First we describe the analytical
modeling framework and then the numerical model.
The Analytical Framework
The presentation of the analytical framework is subdivided into the
demand side, the supply side, equilibrium, and social welfare indicators.
Demand Side. We assume a set of potential users for every origin-destina-
tion (OD) pair in the network. A potential user can contribute to the demand
for only one OD-pair at most, a restrictive assumption in general, but probably
more acceptable in the context of commuting; most people have only one
residential and one work location. However, the model does not account for
group switching; a user cannot switch to another OD-pair due to policy inter-
vention. An individual’s demand function for road use, conditional on car
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ownership, is not perfectly inelastic. If the generalized price of road use
(including monetized travel times and variable taxes) increases, the number
of road trips per unit of time decreases, perhaps reflecting that people would
more often take an alternative transport mode, travel outside the peak time,
or work from home, but not change residential or work location.5 Individuals
within a group are identical, with the exception of one characteristic, their
relative inclination to road use. This heterogeneity is introduced to prevent
car ownership as a function of policy variables from becoming constant and
positive over a certain range and constant and equal to zero outside that
range.
For simplicity, we assume that an individual i’s inverse demand function
for road use is linear
Di ¼ d di  qið1Þ
where subscripts for OD-pairs are suppressed, qi refers to the equilibrium
number of trips demanded, di gives the slope of the individual’s inverse
demand function that varies across individuals to reflect heterogeneity in
terms of the inclination to road use, and d gives the intercept assumed to be
equal across individuals for simplicity. Heterogeneity is thus such that if
di¼ 0.5dj, individual i consumes twice as many trips as individual j for all
generalized cost levels, as long as both own a car. From Equation (1), it is
straightforward to derive that with a generalized price level for road use p, the
consumer would choose
qi ¼
d p
di
and would hence enjoy a ‘‘gross’’ consumer surplus (not accounting for the
costs of vehicle ownership) of
CSGi ¼
1
2
 qi  d p
  ¼ d p
 2
2  dið2Þ
The price level p reflects the price associated with the use of the road condi-
tional on car-ownership. It is assumed to be equal to the sum of the monetized
travel time, the travel time t multiplied by the common single value of time
vot, plus link-based congestion charges t encountered, plus the kilometer
charge tkm multiplied by the length of the trip. If the unit of distance is set
equal to the distance traveled in one unit of time without congestion so that
the trip length becomes equal to the free-flow travel time tfftt, we can write
p ¼ vot  tþ tþ tkm  tffttð3Þ
5All such alternatives are implicitly assumed to be efficiently priced.
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Note that we define t, t, and tfftt over the entire trip in Equation (3), and thus
ignore route choice and summations over links to avoid notational clutter.
In addition to the variable price p, a traveling individual will incur fixed
costs due to the ownership of a car pf. This is the sum of per-unit-of-time
resource costs cf and the fixed ‘‘annual’’ ownership tax tf (‘‘annual’’ in quotation
marks, because the numerical model is calibrated so as to describe a single
morning peak). These are equal across individuals
pf ¼ cf þ tf
We assume that individual i will own a car, indicated by the dummy i taking
the value of 1, if the gross consumer surplus from its use in Equation (2) is at
least equal to pf
di ¼ 1 if CS
G
i  pf
0 otherwise

ð4Þ
We also assume that the vehicle is used exclusively for traveling in the peak
and on the network considered. The net consumer surplus for individual i can
then be written as
CSNi ¼ CS
G
i  pf if di ¼ 1
0 otherwise

ð5Þ
Therefore, an individual’s net and gross consumer surpluses are zero when he
or she prefers not to own a car, consistent with the fact that these surpluses
derive from road use. The marginal willingness to pay for road use Di gives for
every trip the surplus that would be enjoyed from costless road use at p¼ 0
above the surplus that would be enjoyed from the most preferred alternative.
We can ignore surpluses from alternatives such as public transportation,
cycling, and other modes in the welfare analyses if we assume that these
alternatives are optimally priced. We make that simplifying assumption.
From Equations (4) and (2), the critical value of di, d*, can be derived for
which individual i is indifferent between not owning a car and owning one and
using it optimally
d* ¼
d p 2
2  pf
Under these assumptions, the existence of a continuous and smooth aggregate
inverse demand function requires that users form a continuum defined over di.
The type of density function assumed for di will have potentially significant
effects for the results in the numerical model. One way of selecting an appro-
priate density function recognizes explicitly that each type will imply a different
ratio between what can be called the ‘‘short-run aggregate demand elasticity’’
with respect to p, holding car ownership fixed, and the ‘‘long-run aggregate
demand elasticity,’’ accounting for changes in car ownership. A plausible con-
stant ratio of 2 between these two measures is found for a density function
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nðdiÞ ¼ n 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
di
p
where n(di) denotes the density of users with a slope of their individual
inverse demand equal to di, and n is a parameter. With this density function,
the aggregate demand function can be written as
Q ¼
ðd*
0
n 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
di
p

d p
di
ddi
¼ n  d p   2  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃd*p  2  ﬃﬃﬃ0ph i
¼ 2  n 
d p 2ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  pf
p
ð6Þ
implying a long-run elasticity equal to
e ¼ 4  n 
d p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  pf
p  p
Q
The perceived short-run aggregate demand function holding d* fixed can be
derived from the middle line in Equation (6) and reads
~Q ¼ n  d p   2  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃd*pð7Þ
with d* treated as fixed, implying a short-run elasticity equal to
~e ¼ 2  n 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d*
p
 p
Q
¼ 2  n 
d p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2  pf
p  p
Q
which is, indeed, half the value of e.
Last, the inverse aggregate demand function can be found after some
manipulation of Equation (6) and reads
D ¼ d
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pf4
p 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Q
p
ﬃﬃﬃ
24
p  ﬃﬃﬃnpð8Þ
Note that Equations (6) and (8) fully capture car ownership decisions. The
aggregate consumer surplus measures that can be derived from these func-
tions correspond to the net consumer surplus as defined in Equation (5). This
is most easily verified by observing that the aggregate equilibrium consumer
surplus that can be calculated from ~Q in Equation (7)—or from its inverse—is
a summation over all users of the gross surplus in Equation (2). The demand
function Q in Equation (6) and its inverse D in Equation (8) only incorporate
demand from an individual i below a certain price pi at which his or her gross
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consumer surplus is equal to total fixed costs pf. For any equilibrium, the
difference between the consumer surpluses in Equations (6) and (7) is there-
fore exactly equal to the fixed costs incurred by all users using the road in that
equilibrium.
Supply Side. The model considers static, steady-state congestion on a net-
work for which the travel time on a link depends on the equilibrium flow on
that link alone and its capacity. There are no direct link interactions such as
spill-backs at bottlenecks. Cost functions are consistent with the technical
assumptions underlying the self-financing theorem. For link travel-time
functions, this is, for instance, the case with the well-known Bureau of Public
Roads (BPR) function, which implies that for link l the generalized price is
pl ¼ vot  tffttl 
h
1þ b  Ql  cap1l
 kiþ tl þ tffttl  tkm ¼ cl þ tl þ tffttl  tkm
where b and k are parameters typically set at 0.15 and 4, respectively; capl is a
measure of the link’s capacity; Ql gives the equilibrium use level for the link;
and cl is the generalized travel cost for link l. The generalized price is homo-
geneous of degree zero in use and capacity as required for a model calibrated
to produce exact self-financing in its first-best optimum.6
For the cost of providing capacity, constant economies of scale require
that the unit price of capacity is constant for a link so that the total cost for a
link can be written as
Ccapl ¼ capl  ccapl
Network Equilibrium. We use the standard deterministic Wardropian net-
work equilibrium concept. This means that in equilibrium, users from a given
OD-pair will only use minimum generalized price routes provided the equili-
brium generalized price is below the reservation price (dj in Equation (8), with
j denoting OD-pairs) and that there are no routes available with a strictly lower
equilibrium generalized price level. A general formal mathematical treatment
is suppressed as it would duplicate standard expositions as provided in Verhoef
(2002), among many others, while introducing much notational clutter. A sim-
ple case is presented below.
When using inverse aggregate demand functions as in Equation (8) for
every OD-pair, the equilibrium obtained simultaneously describes equilibrium
use of the network given car ownership and car ownership given the network
6Many alternatives to this classic BPR function have been proposed and investigated in the
traffic engineering literature (e.g., Smith, Hall, and Montgomery, 1996 and Singh, 1999). Our
choice for the classic BPR function is not based on any belief that it should be the most realistic
function. The main advantages are its simplicity, and the fact that it is probably the most often
used static speed-flow function in economic studies into road pricing (e.g., Liu and McDonald,
1998; Small and Yan, 2000; among many others), which makes our model in that respect
comparable to prior studies. The qualitative conclusions from our analysis do not depend on the
specific congestion function used.
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equilibrium.Furthermore, theapplication of theWardropianequilibriumprinciple
implies that only one single level of pjwill prevail in equilibrium for an OD-pair j.
However, the shares of travel time costs and tolls in the equilibrium trip price
may of course vary between different routes used for that OD-pair, for example,
when a pay-lane and parallel untolled lanes are simultaneously in use.
Social Welfare. Social surplus measures are used for the definition of social
welfare. The structure of the model enables a distinction between a number of
welfare indicators that we define in this subsection. First, consistent with the
previous discussion, one can distinguish for each OD-pair j between gross and
net consumer surplus
CSGj ¼
ZQj
0
~DjðxÞ  pjdx
(9)
CSNj  CSGj Nj  pf ¼
ZQj
0
DjðxÞ  pjdx
where ~Dj is the inverse of the function ~Qj as defined in Equation (7), Qj is to
be interpreted as the equilibrium demand, Nj is the number of car owners for
OD-pair j, and pf is assumed not to vary over OD-pairs.
Note that the net consumer surplus in Equation (9) is related to the long-
run inverse aggregate demand function, incorporating car-ownership deci-
sions, in a standard way. This means that, apart of course from the results
explicitly pertaining to car ownership, all other results to be derived are
robust in the sense that they would also apply with fixed car ownership and
inverse aggregate demand functions Dj equal to those used now. There would
then be no reason to consider the functions ~Dj because these would coincide
with the functions Dj.
Because all prices in the model could incorporate taxes, Equation (9)
implies a ‘‘variable’’ social surplus—meaning that road capital costs are not
included—of
Sv ¼
XJ
j¼1
CSNj þ f Nj  tf
 
þ
XL
l¼1
f  tl þ tffttl  tkm
 
where f gives the ‘‘shadow price of public funds’’ assumed to be exogenous and
constant. This shadow price is equal to unity when tax revenues are valued
equally high as consumer surplus and may exceed unity when tax revenues
are used to reduce other distortive taxes or set below unity when these
revenues are used in an inefficient way. Note that a total number of J OD-
pairs and L links is assumed to apply for the network; the total number of
potential and active routes—overall, and per OD-pair—need not be specified
in this general treatment.
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Finally, the overall welfare measure to be employed W can now be
defined as
W ¼ Sv  f 
XL
l¼1
capl  ccapl
 !
It is thus assumed that the same shadow price of public funds applies to the
capital cost of infrastructure provision, which reflects our assumption that the
infrastructure is publicly owned and operated.
A Numerical Model
We use a numerical model to study the research questions identified in
Section 1. The model consists of a small static network with three links (1–3)
and three OD-pairs linking three nodes (A–C) depicted in Figure 1. Travelers
for OD-pairs AB and AC have two routes to choose from, (using either link 1 or
2), while all users for OD-pair BC use only link 3. In all exercises, only
equilibria will prevail with both links 1 and 2 used, and with all OD-pairs
possessing a positive demand. We assume that a vehicle is owned solely to be
used on this small network and during the period that is implicitly described
by the static model. Although admittedly unrealistic, the assumption is inher-
ent to the model’s static nature and necessary to obtain individuals’ vehicle
ownership decisions consistent with their behavior on the network.
The equilibrium conditions for such interior equilibria on this simple
network read
c1ðQ1AB þQ1ACÞ þ t1 þ tfftt1  tkm DABðQ1AB þQ2ABÞ ¼ 0ð10aÞ
c2ðQ2AB þQ2ACÞ þ t2 þ tfftt2  tkm DABðQ1AB þQ2ABÞ ¼ 0ð10bÞ
c1ðQ1AB þQ1ACÞ þ t1 þ tfftt1  tkm þ c3ðQ1AC þQ2AC þQBCÞ
þ t3 þ tfftt3  tkm DACðQ1AC þQ2ACÞ ¼ 0
ð10cÞ
c2ðQ2AB þQ2ACÞ þ t2 þ tfftt2  tkm þ c3ðQ1AC þQ2AC þQBCÞ
þ t3 þ tfftt3  tkm DACðQ1AC þQ2ACÞ ¼ 0
ð10dÞ
A C
1
3
2
B
FIGURE 1: The Network Used for the Numerical Model.
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c3ðQ1AC þQ2AC þQBCÞ þ t3 þ tfftt3  tkm DBCðQBCÞ ¼ 0ð10eÞ
where Q1AB identifies the use for OD-pair AB on link 1 and similarly for OD-
pair AC and link 2. An equilibrium for given tax levels is found by solving the
Equations (10a) through (10e). Because of the linear dependence in the sys-
tem, a sixth equation Q1AB=Q
1
AC ¼ Q2AB=Q2AC is added to distribute travelers
from OD-pairs AB and AC proportionally over links 1 and 2.
Table 1 shows the base-case parameters and policy variables. The demand
side parameters were set so as to obtain an equilibrium in which links 1 and 2
are relatively heavily congested with travel times just exceeding twice the
free-flow travel times (see also Table 2), and link 3 is only mildly congested,
while equilibrium short-run demand elasticities are in a plausible range
between 0.3 and 0.4.
All links have a free-flow travel time of half an hour. A value of cap equal
to 1,750 for the BPR cost function implies a doubling of travel times at a use
level of around 2,800 vehicles per hour. This is a high-end estimate of the flow
at which travel times double for a single highway lane and the maximum flow
on a lane is reached (e.g., Small, 1992, Fig. 3.4, p. 66). The latter, however, is
not defined for BPR functions. Furthermore, the implied speed at a flow of
2,000 vehicles per hour is 95.5 km/hr, which is slightly above the estimates
provided by Smith, Hall, and Montgomery (1996, Tables 2 and 4) that range
from 81 to 93km/hr. The difference appears justified by the fact that the free-
flow speeds in their estimates, ranging from 93 to 111 km/hr, are also slightly
below the 120km/hr assumed here.
The hourly unit prices of capacity of E 6 were determined by dividing the
estimated average yearly capital cost of one highway lane kilometer in The
Netherlands (E 0.2 million) by 1,100 (220 working days times 5 peak hours per
working day, assuming 2 peaks) and next by 1,750 (the number of units of
capacity corresponding with a standard highway lane), and finally multiply-
ing by 60 (the number of kilometers corresponding with a free-flow travel time
of half an hour). The calibration procedure thus implicitly assumes that small
changes in capacities induce no effects on travel times outside the peak hours
considered in the model and that off-peak travel absent from the model can
indeed be fully ignored when optimizing capacities.
TABLE 1: Base Parameters and Policy Variables
OD-pair AB OD-pair AC OD-pair BC Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 General
dAB¼ 30 dAC¼ 50 dBC¼ 17.5 tfftt1 ¼ 0:5 tfftt2 ¼ 0:5 tfftt3 ¼ 0:5 vot¼ 7.5
AB¼ 15 AC¼ 3.5 BC¼ 17.5 ccap1 ¼ 6 ccap2 ¼ 6 ccap3 ¼ 6 cf¼ 10
b1¼ 0.15 b2¼ 0.15 b3¼ 0.15 f¼ 1
k1¼ 4 k2¼ 4 k3¼ 4
t1¼ 0 t2¼ 0 t3¼ 0 tf¼ 0
cap1¼ 1,750 cap2¼ 1,750 cap3¼ 1750 tkm¼ 0
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The BPR parameters b and k have their conventional values. A value of
time of E 7.5 corresponds to average estimates for The Netherlands. The fixed
cost of car ownership of E 10 implies, when the car is used only for commuting,
that the yearly fixed costs of capital and depreciation would be E 2,200, which
seems a reasonable order of magnitude for an average car. The shadow price of
public funds is set at unity in the base case. Finally, all taxes are set equal to
zero for the base-case ‘‘no toll’’ equilibrium.
Table 2 summarizes the key characteristics of the base equilibrium. It is
clear that the more heavily used links 1 and 2 make up the more congested
part of the network; each link has a free-flow travel time of 0.5. Furthermore,
the government faces a deficit of E 42,000.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents the results of the modeling exercises that we carried
out to answer the various questions raised in the introduction. The section
starts with a brief discussion of the technical approach followed for finding
second-best optima.
An Extended Algorithm for Finding Second-Best Optima in Transportation
Networks
Despite its small scale, the model includes eight potential policy variables:
three link tolls, a kilometer charge, a fixed vehicle ownership charge, and
three link capacities. Most policy regimes addressed below study only a subset
of these. Nevertheless, the task of finding a second-best optimum can be
cumbersome, particularly when the number of policy variables exceeds two.
Due to interactions between the policy variables, a procedure in which each
policy variable is optimized given the level of the other variables will not
converge to a second-best optimum after one round and may thus become
very time-consuming. At the same time, the model’s dimensions are too
large to allow for the derivation of insightful analytical optimality conditions
TABLE 2: Base Case: Key Characteristics
OD-pair AB OD-pair AC OD-pair BC Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 General
QAB¼ 3,379 QAC¼ 2,267 QBC¼ 1,345 Q1¼ 2,823 Q2¼ 2,823 Q3¼ 3,612 W¼ 17,909
NAB¼ 1,264 NAC¼ 1,438 NBC¼ 294 p1¼ 7.56 p2¼ 7.56 p3¼ 4.39 Cv¼ 58,616
pAB¼ 7.56 pAC¼ 11.95 pBC¼ 4.39 t1¼ 1.01 t2¼ 1.01 t3¼ 0.59 Cf¼ 29,954
eAB¼0.67 eAC¼0.63 eBC¼0.67 Ccap¼ 42,000
TR¼ 0
G¼42,000
Note: tl indicates travel time on link l; C
v the total generalized (variable) travel costs; Cf the
total costs of vehicle ownership; Ccap the total capacity costs; TR total tax revenues; and G the
government budget.
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that would help in easily finding a second-best optimum. Moreover, these
conditions would, of course, be different for each subset of available policy
instruments considered.
We handled this problem by developing a general algorithm for finding
second-best optima. The algorithm is a generalization of the algorithm pre-
sented in Verhoef (2002) that considers the problem of finding second-best
optimal toll levels for a congested network under the constraint that not all
links can be tolled, which is a special case of the type of second-best problems
considered in this paper.
The backbone of the algorithm is formed by the following Lagrangian
 ¼W þ
XR
r¼1
r  constrr
where r denotes the relevant routes defined as routes that for an OD-pair j
offer the lowest possible generalized price and hence can be used in the
equilibrium in the network during an iteration (see below), r denote route-
specific Lagrangian multipliers, and constrr is a constraint that equates mar-
ginal benefits for the relevant OD-pair to the generalized price for the route
considered as given by the left-hand sides of Equations (10a) through (10e) for
the current network.
The algorithm can then be summarized as follows:
Step 0: set starting values for the available policy variables
Step 1: calculate the network equilibrium given the exogenous values of the
available policy variables
Step 2: solve the system of linear equations that is defined by the two sets of
equations that follow below for the variables r for all relevant routes
and all available policy instruments pk (note that with R relevant
routes and K available instruments, this gives a system of RþK
equations in RþK unknowns):
1. q/qQr q/qr¼ 0 for all relevant routes r, evaluated in the net-
work equilibrium determined in step 1
2. q/qpk¼ 0 for all policy instruments p that are available for
optimization, evaluated in the network equilibrium determined in
step 1
Step 3: update the values for the policy instruments by setting pk equal to a
weighted sum of its previous value and the newly predicted value in
step 2
Step 4: check for convergence of all available pk; terminate if convergence is
reached, otherwise return to step 1.
The algorithm bypasses the problem that the full problem defines a set of
2RþK simultaneous nonlinear equations in 2RþK unknowns (each available
pk, each relevant r, and each relevant Qr), the solution to which generally
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cannot be found with the mathematical software used. The algorithm
performed rather efficiently, although the appropriate weighting procedure
for ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘newly predicted’’ levels of pk was not easily determined. A prag-
matic trial-and-error approach was employed, where the trade-off concerned
speed of convergence on the one hand and instability of the convergence process
on the other. Instability was particularly relevant for sets of policy instruments
including both taxes and capacities. With weights of 50 percent for newly
predicted tolls and 5 percent of newly predicted capacities, most exercises
converged within a few minutes on a standard PC. All second-best optima
found were subsequently checked by varying all available policy instruments
by plus and minus 5 percent, keeping the other instruments at their predicted
second-best optimal level. This yielded lower values for the objective in all cases
and the relative reductions (objective values in all cases exceeding 99.5 percent
of the predicted second-best optimal value) indicated flatness of the objective
function around the predicted second-best optimum. Both findings indicate that
the algorithm indeed finds second-best optima as required.
First-Best Configuration
Mathematically speaking, the first-best optimum is a special case of the
broader set of second-best optima and the algorithm described earlier could be
used equally well to identify it. A peculiarity of the first-best optimum is that
all multipliers r for the relevant routes will individually be equal to zero (see
also Verhoef, 2002). Table 3 provides the key characteristics of the first-best
optimum. The table shows that we make at least one unrealistic assumption
for the calculation of the first-best optimum that capacity can be adjusted as if
it were a continuous variable and that capacity investments are reversible so
that all links indeed can obtain a lower capacity in the first-best optimum than
in the base case. The latter assumption could have been easily avoided with a
different base case. We make this assumption because it enables us to consider
the overall optimum for the system. The results suggest making these
assumptions is worthwhile.
First, the results confirm that the self-financing theorem applies to full
networks. The government budget equals zero in the optimum. As in Yang
and Meng (2002), this result holds both at the level of the full network and for
every individual link, which cannot be verified in Table 3.
Next, in the optimum, two taxes appear redundant. The first, tkm, is not
surprising because any nonzero level could be corrected for by adjusting the
link tolls accordingly and obtaining the same network equilibrium. The other
redundant tax is tf. Provided road use is taxed optimally, prospective car
owners face the optimal incentive of purchasing a car when confronted with
the resource costs cf. After paying optimal road taxes for the optimized use
level, the marginal user will enjoy a gross surplus that is equal to the resource
cost of owning a vehicle. All other users’ ownership adds to social welfare;
their gross benefit exceeds the sum of the private and external costs of owning
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and using the car. All nonusers would enjoy a gross surplus from individually
optimized use that would fall short of this sum.
Third, the results show that compared to a somewhat arbitrary, but not
unrealistic, base case where congestion is not evenly spread over the network
and excess capacity in some areas exists, the implementation of joint pricing
and capacity policies may increase the generalized price of transport more
strongly in the originally mildly congested areas (link 3 in our model) than in
the heavily congested areas (links 1 and 2). The reason is that the optimal
capacity reduction is greater. When such capacity reduction is not possible in
practice, a comparable result would be approached in the long run if demand
over the entire network grew steadily over time. The capacity on link 3 would
then not be increased for a much longer time, while congestion and optimal
tolls would increase over time.
Fourth, an interesting feature is that the optimal congestion tax obtains
the same value on all links in the network. With the value of time, the length
of the links, and cost of capacity units equalized, this result follows immedi-
ately from the constant returns to scale assumption. However, we emphasize
that the concern that second-best congestion pricing suffers from the inability
of toll differentiation over place may lose its relevance in the long run,
provided capacities are optimized throughout the network, congestion occurs
throughout the network, and values of time and costs of construction are
indeed constant over space (see below).
A final issue worth addressing is that the relative reduction of car owner-
ship exceeds that of road use for all OD-pairs. This can be explained by the fact
that the users priced off the road will be those who have the highest value of di,
hence those with the smallest inclination to use the road. The sensitivity of car
ownership is of course (much) greater than what would seem realistic at first. It
is therefore important to emphasize the main modeling features responsible.
First, the model ignores the possibilities that a vehicle could be used for trips
other than for the individual’s OD-pair and outside the peak considered.
Another feature is that the timeframe considered is the very long run during
which car ownership is fully adjusted. This is reflected by the assumption that
pf can be fully saved by terminating car ownership and by the fact that no
second-hand car market is modeled. Under these two assumptions, any driver
priced off the road will indeed give up car ownership and the result arises
because these are the drivers with a relatively low inclination to use the road.
Finally, the car ownership effects are magnified by the unrealistic assumption
that all tax levels in the benchmark equilibrium are zero. For example, if
column 7 in Table 4 were taken as the benchmark with the same road capacities
but (optimized) annual taxes in place, a policy change toward first-best
regulation would have been found to increase total car ownership by 7 percent
instead of the significant decrease reported in Table 3. Combined with the
initially low congestion level on link 3—which, given the assumed value of
ccap indicates considerable initial overinvestment in its capacity—these factors
explain the drastic optimal reductions in car ownership.
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Some Second-Best Policies
The results discussed above demonstrate that under first-best conditions,
the self-financing result carries over to full networks and to situations where
car ownership is endogenized, provided prospective car owners make a
rational decision whether or not to own a vehicle. The result has potentially
far reaching policy implications; it opens the way to an efficient and trans-
parent system of simultaneously financing and regulating road networks.
However, as discussed in the introduction, the assumption of first-best policy
feasibility may be considered rather hypothetical. The question then arises to
what extent the result would apply under different types of second-best
regulation. Table 4 shows some key results for various policy scenarios that
were investigated to get some further insight into this question. Column 1
repeats the key results for the first-best policies discussed, and the other
columns depict those that we consider the most realistic alternative second-
best configurations.
Column 2 presents the results for link-specific tolls while keeping
capacities fixed. In that case the optimal toll for link 3 is lower than under
first-best policies, which is consistent with the fact that congestion will be
less severe because capacity will not be reduced. The fact that the tolls on
links 1 and 2 are higher than under first-best policies may be surprising
because these links’ capacities will be reduced under first-best regulation,
albeit slightly. The explanation is that under first-best regulation the
optimal trip price on link 3 becomes much higher, discouraging trips by
users from OD-pair AC and hence reducing congestion on links 1 and 2
compared to the second-best case (2). The next-to-last row shows that with
unchanged capacity costs and the implementation of pricing the government
deficit will of course shrink by 65 percent. The final row shows that the
implementation of pricing alone will lead to an efficiency gain equal to
61 percent of what can be achieved under first-best regulation, indicated
with the index o¼ 0.61.
Column 3 shows the results for the mirror case, where capacities can be
adjusted while tolls are kept equal to zero. The associated second-best
capacities exceed those in the base case for links 1 and 2, but fall short of it
for link 3, which seems plausible given the relatively heavy initial congestion
on links 1 and 2 and the mild congestion on link 3. All capacities exceed first-
best capacities. This result is consistent with, but not fully explained by, the
observation that a marginal reduction in toll levels from the first-best optimum
will lead to an upward adjustment in optimal capacities. The positive direct
effect, the reduction in travel costs for the users, will always dominate the
negative indirect effect, the negative net social benefits from the induced
increase in road use (e.g., Arnott and Yan, 2000; see also Wheaton, 1978;
Wilson, 1983; and d’Ouville and McDonald, 1990, on optimal capacity choice
under suboptimal pricing). The welfare gain from this policy amounts to
37 percent of first-best gains and the government runs a deficit.
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The relative welfare gains from pricing (column 2) and capacity adjust-
ments (column 3), o¼ 0.61 and o¼ 0.37 respectively, nearly sum up to unity.
This suggests nearly perfect additivity of welfare gains from both policies for
the numerical model as opposed to sub- or superadditivity, where the gains
from joint implementation would be below or above the gains from implement-
ation in isolation. Nevertheless, if capacity choice is irreversible, the nearly
perfect additivity of course does not mean that there would be little lost when
the policies are implemented sequentially rather than simultaneously. Apart
from the obvious fact that a sequential implementation implies suboptimal
welfare gains before both instruments are optimized, the maximum welfare
gains from capacity adjustments in isolation require these to be set at levels
above optimal levels. Therefore, it is typically not optimal to set capacities at
second-best optimal levels as indicated in column 3 in Table 4 if subsequent
pricing is anticipated. An advantage of starting with pricing would be that
prices can be adjusted more easily than capacities at least from a technical
viewpoint.
One of the unanticipated results concerns the second-best policy described
in column 4 in which capacities can be adjusted and a flat kilometer charge
can be applied. This policy results in a first-best efficiency gain and the
government budget is perfectly balanced. As explained above, with the value
of time and unit costs of capacity equalized over the network, speeds and first-
best charges per kilometer will also become equalized over the network at
least insofar that speeds are homogeneous of degree zero in use level and
capacity. Indeed, one can easily confirm that the value of tkm in column 4
implies link tolls equal the values of t1, t2 and t3 in column 1; the length of
each link is 0.5. In contrast, columns 5 and 2 illustrate that if capacities
cannot be adjusted and only tkm can be set, efficiency will typically fall short
of that under differentiated tolls, o¼ 0.53 versus o¼ 0.61. Thus a technical or
political constraint on differentiation of per kilometer tolls need not lead to
efficiency losses, provided capacities can be optimized.
This equivalence breaks down whenever values of time or capacities are
not constant over the network. An interesting question then becomes how
much will be lost by imposing the constraint that the per kilometer charges
be equal over the network in such a case. To shed some light on this issue, the
simulations were rerun for the case where ccap3 was lowered from E 6 to E 3
(the results are not shown in Table 4). Capacity is thus considerably cheaper
in the less congested area, which is realistic because land prices are likely
lower. First-best regulation then entails an optimal toll of E 2.83 for link 3, in
contrast to E 4.93 under base-case parameters, with a capacity equal to
67 percent of the initial value, as opposed to 44 percent. The optimal tolls for
links 1 and 2 remain unaltered at E 4.93, but their optimal capacities now
increase to 103 percent of the initial value, as opposed to 97 percent, due to the
increased demand for OD-pair AC following the cost reduction on link 3. The
variation in optimal toll levels indicates that a flat kilometer charge in combi-
nation with capacity adjustments will no longer succeed in replicating the
426 JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 44, NO. 3, 2004
# Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2004.
first-best. However, the relative efficiency of this second-best policy—involving
tkm¼E 8.10, cap1 and cap2 at 107 percent of the initial values, and cap3 at 63
percent—nevertheless realizes 98 percent of the achievable welfare gains under
this adjusted parameterization. Therefore, even with capacity costs varying
over a network, an inability to differentiate per-kilometer tolls over a network
may induce far smaller efficiency losses than anticipated if capacities can be
adjusted. Moreover, self-financing may still nearly hold; the government deficit
is dwarfed to 3.6 percent of the initial deficit in this run. Of course, the very
high relative efficiency may be partly due to the remaining symmetry in the
network other than through capacity costs. However, the equal lengths of links
is not likely to contribute to this result because a change in the length would
proportionately alter the optimal link toll for a given flow and would therefore
leave the optimal kilometer charge for that link unaffected. Relative efficiency
may however be reduced if, for some reason, cost functions would differ over
links.
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 4 consider the effects of fixed annual taxes
tf with and without simultaneous capacity adjustments. An intuitive result
that optimal capacities in column 6 are higher than under first-best regulation
is explained by the absence of user charges and the resulting higher equili-
brium use levels. For the same reason, the relative efficiency of tf alone in
column 7, with o¼ 0.37, falls short of that of use charges in columns 2 and 5,
with o¼ 0.61 and o¼ 0.53, respectively. Also, with capacity adjustments in
column 6, o¼ 0.71 is below unity, its value in columns 1 and 4. At the same
time, the government deficit remains larger than under use charges. In
absence of capacity adjustments, this is the joint result of a lower equilibrium
number of car owners and lower average taxes per user; recall that users
typically make more than one trip in equilibrium (see Table 2). With capacity
adjustments, a third factor is the higher second-best optimal capacity. There-
fore, optimized annual taxes appear less attractive than optimized use taxes
in our model under the chosen parameterization from both perspectives of
efficiency and government finance.
Last, columns 8–10 concern pay lanes in link 2 with and without capacity
adjustments. The relatively low second-best optimal and limited efficiency
gains when capacity is fixed at 50 percent of the total capacity between
nodes A and B and therefore not adjusted, o¼ 0.15, agrees with earlier find-
ings (for example, Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld, 1996; Verhoef and Small,
2004). The low value derives from congestion spillovers created on the
untolled parallel road that push down the optimal second-best toll level and
the associated efficiency gains. Column 9 shows that when the capacity of the
pay lane is also optimized, the associated efficiency gains increase. The capa-
city in the numerical example is increased by 65 percent and o nearly doubles
to 0.29; however, the government budget worsens. The tolls collected on the
pay lane fall short of the additional capacity costs after optimal expansion. Of
course, this is not necessarily the case. If the initial capacity coincidentally
was nearly optimal, the simultaneous implementation of a second-best toll
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and optimization of the capacity would have led to an improvement of
the government budget, assuming a positive second-best toll (see Verhoef,
Nijkamp, and Rietveld, 1996 for the possibility of negative second-best tolls
for pay lanes).
A related question is whether full financing of an entire network is
possible when only pay lanes are in place. Our numerical results confirm the
intuitive answer that this would generally not be the case and that substantial
deficits would be expected. Typically, many drivers will avoid all tolls by using
only the free lanes and those who pay a toll are charged below their direct
marginal external costs. Nevertheless, full financing may occur coincidentally
in exceptional cases. An example could be constructed on the basis of column 9
in Table 4, which shows the final second-best case where both cap1 and cap2
can be optimized simultaneously with t2. Optimization would lead to a com-
plete removal of link 1 and expansion of link 2 to 108.5 percent of the initial
joint capacity of links 1 and 2 together, hence 217 percent of link 2’s initial
capacity alone. This result nicely illustrates the inefficiency of leaving some
parallel capacity unpriced; optimality requires the size of this part of the
capacity to be reduced to zero in exchange for increases in priced capacity.
Now consider the financing under this regime. The toll revenues on link 2
exceed its capacity costs by nearly 3.5 percent; the toll exceeds the marginal
external congestion costs on link 2 because the external costs of users from
OD-pair AC on link 3 are partly recovered through the charge on link 2. This
suggests that with a very small link 1 and very low unit capacity costs for link
3, a balanced or even a small positive government budget would be theoreti-
cally possible under second-best optimal pricing and capacity choice, provided
a certain share of users of unpriced links is present on the pay lane and
capacity costs for unpriced links are sufficiently low. Although the practical
relevance is probably negligible, clearly the theoretical point is that exact self-
financing, or even a budget surplus, on a full network with some unpriced
links and second-best optimal tolls and capacities is not impossible.
Absence of Congestion on Some Roads
For self-financing under optimal regulation of a full network to hold, it is
required that in the optimum congestion exists and hence, optimal tolls are
positive on all roads that have positive unit capacity costs. In reality, this may
not always be true, for instance, when the assumption of capacity as a con-
tinuous variable becomes binding and some minimum capacity exists (e.g., a
single lane) for which no congestion occurs in the optimum, while the costs of
supplying this capacity are positive. To illustrate the breakdown of self-
financing under these circumstances, we ran a simulation in which link 3
was assumed to be uncongested by definition and an arbitrary capacity and
associated costs were assigned to this link. As expected, the result was that
under first-best regulation self-financing still holds exactly for links 1 and 2,
with t1¼ t2¼ 4.93 of course still holding. The optimal t3, however, becomes
428 JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 44, NO. 3, 2004
# Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2004.
equal to zero because of the absence of congestion on link 3, yielding a
government deficit equal to the assumed capacity costs for the uncongested
link 3.
An Above-Unity Shadow Price of Public Funds f
A second reason first-best regulation might not lead to exact self-
financing even though the cost functions satisfy the required technical
assumptions occurs when the shadow price of public funds f differs from
unity. The use of an exogenous f to reflect that tax revenues may be used to
lower existing distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy (on labor, for
example) can of course be criticized on various grounds. The precise value of
f would depend on exactly how the tax revenues are used. In addition, its
value in reality will not be constant. Furthermore, partial equilibrium models
such as ours typically ignore many aspects that would affect the true value
of f and that may often make it lower than what might be expected on
intuitive grounds; relevant mechanisms to consider include the so-called
tax-interaction, complementarity, and tax-shifting effects (see e.g., Lindsey
and Verhoef, 2001). Such shortcomings are important to bear in mind, but do
not mean that an exogenous f could not be used to study the impacts of
general tax revenue raising objectives upon optimal pricing and capacity
choices for road networks.
If f is set above (below) unity, first-best regulation will lead to a budget
surplus (deficit). A second consequence is that the optimal annual tax tf will
no longer generally be equal to zero. The reason is that the implied second
objective of raising (or avoiding) tax revenues as efficiently as possible would
typically require all available taxes to be adjusted so as to minimize the
overall distortions introduced; however, tkm remains redundant for the same
reason as before. The sign of tf, however, will not generally be that of f 1. An
increase in tf namely induces two relevant effects. The first is the direct effect
of increasing the revenues from those users who remain in possession of a
vehicle, suggesting the sign would be the same. The second is the effect of
reducing the tax revenues from annual and use taxes from those users who
give up car ownership in response to the higher annual tax. This would work
in the opposite direction. The latter effect may become particularly important
because use and annual taxes can be set simultaneously. Starting from tf¼ 0
and positive use taxes, a marginally lower annual tax attracts more users.
Raising the use taxes such that the same individual remains the marginal car
owner, approximately requiring a marginal increase in use taxes such that his
total tax sum remains unchanged, would mean additional revenues from the
nonmarginal users who drive more and therefore pay more in additional use
taxes than they gain from the lower annual tax.
Which of these effects will dominate in reality is an empirical matter that
largely depends on the elasticity of car ownership with respect to annual
taxes. Our numerical model provides an illustration of the possible dominance
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of the second effect, which is consistent with the relatively high elasticity of
car ownership discussed earlier. At f¼ 1.1, we find a modest negative optimal
tf¼0.56, the budget losses of which are more than compensated for through
the optimal use taxes t1¼ t2¼ 6.10 and t3¼ 5.42 (all use taxes were equal to
4.93 under base parameters).7 These taxes exceed the marginal external costs
(again equal to 4.93 on each link), which is reminiscent of Oi’s (1971) result
that with heterogeneous consumers, a two-part pricing monopolist can
generally increase profits by setting the price per usage above marginal cost.
In contrast, optimal capacities are smaller than under base parameters,
89 percent of initial capacities for links 1 and 2 and 40 percent for link 3,
which is not only consistent with the lower use levels following the higher use
taxes, but also reflects that capacity costs, too, are weighed with f and hence
have become higher.
Budget Constraints
Apart from the theoretical objections against the use of a shadow price of
public funds f to introduce budgeting issues in the analysis, a practical
objection could be that government budgets may often be allocated exogen-
ously to the details of the policies implemented. Therefore, a final point that
we would like to address concerns the impacts of an exogenously determined
budget, where a balanced budget appears a natural choice, rather than result-
ing endogenously from the optimization of the available instruments. Clearly,
a balanced-budget constraint will not be binding in our model if all instru-
ments can be used; otherwise, one simply finds the unconstrained optimum
discussed earlier, given that we set f¼ 1. Therefore, we will consider the case
where capacities are given at their base-case levels and the regulator can set
the use tolls and annual tax to maximize efficiency under a budget constraint.
Apart from an equality constraint that the budget be balanced B¼ 0, we will
also consider the inequality constraints B 0 where no deficit is allowed,
perhaps motivated by considerations of intersectoral fairness, and B 0
where no surplus is allowed, motivated by considerations of fairness for road
users. A convenient way of presenting the main results is by varying ccap such
that both cases are covered where an unconstrained optimization through the
setting of t1, t2, t3, and tf (the levels of which are independent of ccap) would
lead to budget surpluses, and where it would lead to deficits. Figure 2 presents
the results.
The upper panel shows the optimal levels of the four taxes under the
equality constraint and the lower panel shows the efficiency gain relative to
that under unconstrained optimization through the setting of t1, t2, t3, and tf
with capacities fixed as presented in column 2 of Table 4. This index will be
7If the demand for road use is sufficiently elastic, it is conceivable that also use taxes would
fall if f is increased.
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FIGURE 2: Relative Efficiency of Second-best Link Tolls t1, t2 and t3 and
Annual Taxes tF, for Given Capacities and under Three Types of Budget
Constraints.
Notes: At ccap¼3.924, optimal use of t1, t2 and t3 (and tf optimized at 0) results in a zero
budget. Beyond ccap¼ 5.581, B¼0 is not attainable even under profit maximizing use of t1, t2, t3,
and tf.
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indicated with an index o# below and is calculated by applying f¼ 1 to
government revenues and expenses.
At ccap¼ 3.924, an unconstrained use of t1, t2, t3, and tf happens to result
in a balanced budget. In this case, tf is optimized at zero for the same reasons
as in the unconstrained optimum. The concave pattern of o# with the max-
imum at ccap¼ 3.924 clearly shows that the welfare losses of imposing a
balanced-budget constraint rise more than proportionally with the absolute
value of the surplus or deficit that would occur under unconstrained pricing.
For higher levels of ccap, additional revenues are required to obtain a balanced
budget, which is realized most efficiently in our model by subsidizing vehicle
ownership (tf is negative), while simultaneously raising the link tolls above
their unconstrained optimal levels—both to an extent increasing in ccap. The
interpretation is the same as for a shadow price of public funds f exceeding
unity as discussed earlier. The constraint B 0 is not binding in this region so
its o# remains equal to unity.
The opposite results are found for ccap< 3.924. Noteworthy in this region
is that the toll on the relatively uncongested link 3, t3, becomes negative for
sufficiently low values of ccap. Furthermore, a constraint that total tax reven-
ues should be zero on the left end of Figure 2 does not mean that o# becomes
zero. Namely the constraint does not mean that all taxes individually must be
equal to zero and some efficiency gains remain possible (o#¼ 0.3).
Finally, on the right end of the diagrams beyond ccap¼ 5.581, a balanced
budget is not attainable even under profit-maximizing pricing and the dia-
grams assume that profit-maximizing pricing is in place in this region
regardless of the exact value of ccap. Consequently, if capacities are fixed
but are set sufficiently far off optimal levels, self-financing may even become
infeasible. Although not easily discerned from the lower panel, profit-
maximizing pricing in fact induces a small efficiency loss compared to no
pricing in this region; o# has become equal to 0.00013. The closeness to 0 is
coincidental.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has developed a simple road network model with endogenous
car ownership to study various aspects of the Mohring-Harwitz (1962) result
that are relevant for practical application of the principle. A number of find-
ings stand out.
First, optimal per-kilometer congestion tolls and optimal speeds become
equal over the network, provided capacities are optimized throughout the
network, congestion occurs throughout the network, values of time and costs
of construction are constant over the network, and the function that relates
travel times to the ratio of use over capacity is the same over the entire
network. As a result, a flat kilometer charge in conjunction with optimal
capacity policies is capable of reaching the optimum and concerns over the
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inability of this instrument to differentiate over space may become less
relevant in the longer run when capacities can be optimized. Clearly, from a
dynamic perspective, the ability of toll differentiation over time will remain an
important requisite for optimal congestion tolling mechanisms. Although a
flat kilometer charge becomes truly second-best as soon as unit capacity costs
vary over the network, our numerical results suggest that the associated
welfare losses may remain very small provided capacities and the kilometer
charge remain optimized. A 50 percent reduction in unit capacity costs in the
lightly congested area resulted in a reduction of only 2 percent in the effi-
ciency gains from flat kilometer charges compared to differentiated tolls, both
with capacities optimized.
As a corollary, a second result of interest is that the implementation of the
principle may very well lead to a larger increase in trip costs as experienced by
drivers in initially less congested areas than in more heavily congested areas.
This may be at odds with intuitive expectations and reflects that often an
initially low congestion level may be interpreted equally well as an initial
excess capacity.
Third, under second-best pricing on only a subset of links, self-financing
no longer necessarily occurs. The numerical results however demonstrate
that the efficiency from pay lanes may increase significantly if their cap-
acities are optimized. This is even more evident if the capacities of untolled
lanes can also be optimized simultaneously and reductions are possible;
however, the consequence is that the untolled lanes are then eliminated
and the term ‘‘pay lane’’ would be misplaced. Furthermore, although a
government deficit under second-best optimal pay-lane policies is very likely,
a balanced budget or even a surplus cannot be excluded on theoretical
grounds. However, this requires that a certain number of drivers from an
untolled upstream or downstream serial link use the pay lane.
Next, if roads have some minimum technical capacity such as the cheapest
possible lane, self-financing under optimal pricing over a full network may
break down because some roads with positive capacity costs may have optimal
tolls equal to zero. In addition, if capacities cannot be adjusted, imposing a
balanced-budget constraint on pricing may lead to substantial efficiency losses
that increase more rapidly as optimal short-run pricing implies larger deficits
or surpluses.
Finally, unless a nonunitary shadow price of public funds applies, optimal
pricing involves a zero fixed (‘‘annual’’) tax in our model (in which no
externalities from car ownership per se, such as through parking, are pre-
sent). Optimal road pricing provides optimal incentives for car-ownership
decisions, provided vehicles are optimally priced. However, when tax-revenue-
raising objectives are also relevant, optimal ownership taxes become a rele-
vant instrument, though the objective of raising revenues as efficiently as
possible may be served better by a negative annual tax accompanied with
increases in use taxes than by a positive one.
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